The global COVID-19 epidemic has lasted for almost two years, and the important role of science and technology in the response to the epidemic has been demonstrated. However, the various technological control measures adopted to fight the epidemic have also caused a lot of controversy and concerns. This has aroused the interest of technology philosophers who specialize in scientific and technological issues: from the perspective of technology philosophy, what does the COVID-19 epidemic really mean? Three philosophers of technology from China, the United States and Germany carried out collaborative research on global epidemic technology governance. The phased result paper "Cultural Comparison of Global Epidemic Technology Management" was published in the first issue of 2021 of the journal Science, Economy, and Society. . [Electronic version see: https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783748910961-301/editorial-der-kontroverse?page=0] Their views have received strong attention from the international technology philosophy community, and 9 people come from all over the world Of technology philosophers issued targeted opinions. The whole set of written talks was published in German "Technology Philosophy Yearbook 2021" (edited by Alexander Friedrich et al., published by Nomos Publishing, Germany in 2021) in English and German. All authors are senior scholars with outstanding reputation in the international philosophy of technology. All aspects of the relationship between science and technology and the response to the epidemic are inspiring for reflections on the COVID-19 epidemic.
The Paper (www.thepaper.cn) is authorized to publish this set of written talks. The entire group of 10 articles is now divided into the first, the middle, and the next. This article is the first one, including the "COVID-19 Perspective: Philosophical Lessons from the Global Plague" and Three responses to "Population and Living Systems, or: Curves and Straight Lines", "The Tension Zone Between Control and Experimentation: The Outline of "Refined Technical Governance"? "Public Interests and Personal Interests: The Impact of the COVID-19 Epidemic."
Philosophical Lessons from the Global Plague COVID-19 Perspective: Philosophical Lessons from the Global Plague
Authors: Liu Yongmou, Carl Mitcham, Alfred Nordman; Translation: Peng Jiafeng
About the author: Liu Yongmou, professor and doctoral supervisor of the School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, mainly engaged in the philosophy of science and technology, science and technology and public policy research. Email: legend74@163.com. Carl Mitcham (Carl Mitcham) is a professor in the Humanities Department of Colorado School of Mines and a chair professor at Renmin University of China. He is mainly engaged in the research of philosophy of technology and engineering philosophy. Alfred Nordmann is a professor of philosophy at Darmstadt University of Technology in Germany, mainly engaged in philosophy of technology and STS research. Peng Jiafeng is a 2020 PhD student in the School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China.
In Europe and North America, the COVID-19 epidemic is sometimes referred to as a stress-test, while in China, it is called a "mirror mirror" in which the good, the fool, the beautiful and the ugly are reflected. The epidemic is a challenge to the public, government, and political system. Many problems and characteristics have been revealed in it. The way we live in the social-technical world or technosphere is also more clearly presented.
Three philosophers of technology from different countries once gathered at the Renmin University of China in Beijing. By collecting significant observations, hereby present a concluding point of view, showing that the philosophy of technology and understanding of the COVID-19 epidemic (SARS-CoV) -2. COVID-19) and the relevance of various countermeasures. [1]
Although we have compared the experiences of various countries in responding to the COVID-19 pneumonia epidemic, our goal is not to determine the similarities and differences. Public political narratives have been widely known and are closely related to journalists, political theorists, and opinion leaders. In these narratives, the rules of interpretation involve culture, ideology, and political systems, China's response to the epidemic, the efficiency of Germany, and the state of chaos and violence in the United States. When the narrative turns to a technical challenge that requires epidemiology to deal with, the rules of interpretation change. From this perspective, what we see in different countries are actually variants of the same type of action—similar dilemmas and adjustments, but different responses. When technical management issues are put first, we do not always know what the alternatives are, how to negotiate these issues, and their full implications for people, nature, and society. The vocabulary of power and politics, ideology, and governance theory is not enough to open the "black box" of social restraint (Sachzwang) or technical urgency (technical exigency). Regarding the technical and technical governance aspects of the epidemic, when looking at the demon mirror of the plague on a global scale, we hope to pursue a self-understanding like a philosopher.
1. The main tone of public discussion reflects a kind of technical, and perhaps a technocratic mindset. Accordingly, the "COVID-19 crisis" is defined in terms of technology and management. It requires an effective response to viruses and "logic of exponential spreading"-how to flatten the curve, how to track and break the chain of infection, how to keep the economy running, how to adjust the capacity of the medical and health system .
2. Philosophers and political theorists usually emphasize the differences between cultural traditions and public values, because this is their common analytical framework. As philosophers of technology, we look at the current situation from the perspective of technological action—seeing that society is struggling to cope with the major practical problems of epidemic management and control, while succumbing, struggling—even confronting—a kind of separation from and opposition to the political realm and public values The discussion of technological dominance has a fixed mindset.
3. Whether it is subtle subversion or violent confrontation, any discussion of what needs to be done and alternative methods represent a shift in register, which goes beyond the technical simplicity of protecting the public from the threat of uncontrolled spread of viruses ( the technical brief).
4. We have identified three technical paradigms or methods. The "grand-scheme optimizing" paradigm evoked the procedures of digital governance through the national bureaucracy and the 19th century demographic science (Bevölkerungswissenschaft). It regards all members of the political body as risk-taking nodes, and their system interaction needs to be managed in a unified manner. The "patchwork satisficing" paradigm uses popular knowledge from many different sources. This knowledge does not provide a comprehensive control method, but they work together redundantly to significantly reduce the risk of infection. Therefore, "patch together satisfies" is similar to citizen science (Bürgerwissenschaft). The third paradigm is the "real-time responsiveness" paradigm: local monitoring and management are everywhere, and knowledge and tools are developed and deployed like the fire department. Once an epidemic occurs, the "fire" will be extinguished , The chain of infection will be cut off through "real-time response." Although these technological paradigms compete with each other, they have not been discussed publicly. The competition between them can only become apparent when priorities change, policy adjustments, and the transfer of responsibilities among various actors.
5. These three methods correspond to three practical attitudes to deal with uncertainty. Many people are more inclined to be cautious and adopt strict risk aversion strategies ("big plan optimization"). Others are willing to take risks because they have taken preventive measures and kept the risks within a reasonable acceptable range ("patch together Satisfaction”), while others modify their risk behavior in a real-time feedback loop that continuously evaluates the measures taken and current trends (“real-time response”). Another "method" to deal with the "COVID-19 crisis" technical framework is to deny the authenticity of the uncertainty and risk. People may call this some form of "defect"-stay away from those who see the problem , In some cases away from the mainstream of society.
6. These three methods are also different: "Big Plan Optimization" returns to the country's administrative practice, thermodynamics, gas laws, statistical demography (Bevölkerungswissenschaft), especially in the 19th century, and also returns to a specific knowledge / The rule of power system promotes scientists such as Christian Deston[2], Anthony Fauci and Zhong Nanshan to the status of national celebrities and authoritative experts. From the perspective of science and technology research (STS), constructive technology assessment (TA), co-design, open science and open innovation, it is shocking that modern knowledge How quickly society recovered to a model considered outdated in times of crisis. Although the contributions of citizens and "citizen science" are manifested in "patchwork satisfaction" and "real-time response," this does not stem from the discussion about the best way to broadly mobilize distribution capabilities in 21st century society.
7. The common "everyday masks/Alltagsmasken" technology is viewed differently and is subject to the adjustment of various different technical methods. Their utility and efficacy were initially denied, and then restored in redundant measures. At the same time, they symbolize efficiency, unity, acquiescence or complicity, and are used in national projects to "fight the epidemic." On the contrary, sanitation technology is implemented in an almost unquestionable way, and its basis seems to be the public health habits that empower everyone. Various statistics and control techniques are questioned in completely different ways, and these techniques only provide information and communication for predetermined technical goals.
8. Everyone lives in a technology circle, and this technology circle is evolving and changing gradually over time. It can be a way of life for us to coordinate the relationship between people and technology. The pandemic is disturbing people in subtle ways, and it can subvert established lifestyles. Formal appointments, contract seals, and commitments that people used to shake hands are now being replaced by clumsy elbow touches or polite bows. Family life and neighbourhood interaction no longer revolve around "seeing" (see), but reorganization around avoiding each other. In public, people no longer expect a person to show their face. Like the AIDS (HIV/AIDS) experience in the 1980s or the SARS (SARS) experience in 2003, these are not minor adjustments that reflect new views or beliefs, but profoundly reconstruct human relationships. In the world of AIDS, sex is not what it used to be. Under the new normal of COVID-19, how will we face each other?
9. Combining the ideas of Defoe ("Plague Year Diary"), Camus ("Plague") or Brecht ("Radwechsel" or "changing tires"), it is possible to describe the situation of technical treatment of the COVID-19 epidemic To be exiled at home and lack patience for the present. Losing the future and the past is tantamount to losing politics-all it leaves behind is just a resistance to the rule of necessity. In the era of pests, plagues, and technological governance, we have lost the right to imagine another world for ourselves, or simply at the cost of completely ignoring current needs. However, it is not necessary to look at this kind of "incarceration" from the perspective of prohibition, and it is possible to treat the obvious prohibition as a limitation of the space for change. For example, maintaining social distancing is a way to reduce infection rates, and at the same time, it may be a way to stay calm and avoid tragedies caused by fanaticism. We think of Boccaccio ("The Decameron"), who discovered the joy of storytelling while escaping from the Black Death in Florence in 1350 and opened the door to the Renaissance.
10. The response to the COVID-19 epidemic does not in itself bring any hope of change, nor can it lead the world to a slower, sustainable and fairer world. It would rather bear the danger that tensions will rise between people who realize the "rational" of unity by acknowledging the necessity of technology, and the somewhat reckless and rebellious populists who claim to be away from the political realm by invoking freedom and human rights. . If possible, this tension should be relieved by a gentle technological governance model that favors existing technologies and management choices. This technological governance bears in mind: if you want to maintain a way of life intervention, it involves Imagination of a better life in the future.
In a world ruled by objective constraints or technical necessity, when one looks at society, politics, culture, or ideology, more things happen than at first glance. The same goes for the ten suggestions above. Despite being aware of different technological models, alternative designs, and opportunities for restructuring, we still focus our attention on what needs to be done, which puts technical pressure on the willful politics and self-determination fields. If we are right, the dilemma will inevitably arise when the "COVID-19 crisis" is just announced.
It is true that the way this tension is expressed in China, Germany, the United States and other societies is quite different. Perhaps the tension in China is accommodated by a gentle technological governance that incorporates technological necessity in the sense of public virtue and national identity. In Germany, tensions have led to maintaining a purely managerial political model that requires a lot of work, and mild uneasiness and unruly protests have led to open struggles on the streets of the United States. Only time will tell us whether this analysis will help reveal potential dilemmas, emphasize the reorganization of interpersonal relationships in the global epidemic technology circle, and turn our attention to the micro-political aspects of technological crisis governance.
Notes:
[1] This article is an excerpt from a longer work to be completed. Criticism and comments are welcome. The phased version was published in: Liu Yongmou, Carl Mitcham, Alfred Nordman, Li Baoyan Translated. Cultural comparison of global epidemic technology control[J]. Science·Economy·Society, 2021, 39(01): 10-21.
[2] Translator's note: Professor Christian Drosten, director of the Institute of Virology at Charité Hospital in Berlin. In 2003, he was one of the co-discoverers of the SARS virus and developed the first batch of SARS virus diagnostic methods.
Population and life system, or: curve and straight line
Author: Andreas Fox; Translation: Zhu Yingyu
About the author: Andreas Folkers is a researcher at the Department of Sociology, University of Giessen, Germany, mainly engaged in environmental politics, biopolitics and STS research. Yingyu Zhu is a graduate student of 2017 at the Darmstadt University of Technology in Technology and Philosophy.
The philosophical thinking of Liu Yongmou, Mitcham, and Nordman on the Covid-19 pandemic-I think it also includes sociological and scientific history perspectives-is very clear and convincing. Therefore, I will not delay time on individual issues, but make a short but important supplement in my opinion. The three authors accurately discussed the significance of population science (Bevölkerungswissenschaft) in controlling the current epidemic. Statistics, color maps, curves and simulation systems, indicators and basic infection numbers once again show the society what "the meaning of living things in a living world" (Foucault). In fact, there is almost no such situation in history: the views of population science are not only eagerly absorbed by a few experts and political decision makers, but also eagerly understood by the people under test. Taking a look at the morbidity value and R value at breakfast has become a morning prayer during the COVID-19 crisis.
In the current epidemic control, another kind of biopolitics logic also plays a very important role, and most of the time, it mainly exists in philosophical commentary, and it is rarely paid attention to: it is the vitale system (vitale Systeme) Of biopolitics. Different from the biopolitics of population, the biopolitics of life system does not mainly rely on demographic statistics, but also pays attention to the capacity limitations, vulnerabilities and bottlenecks of so-called critical infrastructures in the process of maintaining the functioning of the social technology system. Such as transportation, energy, or medical care. The current epidemic is characterized by the interaction between the biopolitics of the population and the biopolitics of the life system, and how the two affect each other. Perhaps this relationship can be most clearly observed in the "flattening curve" graphs that can be seen everywhere at the beginning of the epidemic. In addition to a curve that is clearly based on population science assumptions, there is also a horizontal straight line showing how flat the curve must be to ensure that the healthcare system is not overloaded. To a certain extent, the life system plays the role of the "Lingbo dance pole" of the population. The disaster threshold will be clearly shown through the intersection between the population’s infection dynamics and the capacity of the living system. In this regard, it is not only necessary to protect the public from infection, but also to protect the medical and health system from being overwhelmed by the excessive number of patients. Hypothetically speaking, the mortality rate at the population level and the capacity limit of the medical system directly affect each other. People’s lives actually depend on technical infrastructure elements like intensive care beds and ventilators. A fundamental question that is equally well-known in traffic planning here is: How can we ensure that there is enough capacity for use even during peak periods—for example, is there enough space for trains and highways? The only difference is that the consequences of congestion in the healthcare system are not just that some people are late for work.
The close connection between the biopolitics of population and the biopolitics of life systems can also be seen from the key bottleneck of insufficient detection capabilities in the early stages of the pandemic. Knowledge infrastructure, from cotton swabs for testing to laboratory equipment, is particularly critical to the cognitive foundation of the biopolitics of the population. In addition, at least in Germany, the role of health authorities as critical infrastructure, more precisely experts in population science and epidemic simulation systems, was highlighted in the second wave of the epidemic. In other words, when the contact tracing capabilities are overloaded, the simulation system usually indicates that the epidemic will spread more quickly in the population.
A few simple examples can already show that the living system has become a core-in Latour's terminology-matter of concern in epidemic control. It is also clear that life systems and critical infrastructure, to borrow from Puig de la Bellacasa, have always meant matters of care. The terms "capacity limit" and "bottlenecks" may sometimes seem too technical, but as it has been emphasized, the healthcare system does not only depend on technical instruments, but also on the expertise of nurses. -how) and how they express that kind of care in concrete terms. The infrastructure of public services often relies on low-paying nursing work. This may also be a "philosophical lesson" brought about by this crisis. As practiced in feminist technoscience studies (feminist technoscience studies), technology and care (Sorge) must be considered at the same time, instead of treating technology as definite-ent-care (ent- sorgend, se-curitas)-the fate of modernity (Geschick), as opposed to the development (Welterschließung) of the sorgend world for which Dasein (Dasein) was originally concerned.
The tension between control and testing: the outline of "refined technical governance"?
Author: Stephen Besson; Translation: Zhang Yafei
About the author: Stefan Böschen, a professor at the Human Technology Center of Aachen University, Germany, is mainly engaged in STS, modern social theory and risk research. Zhang Yafei is a 2014 master student in Intercultural Studies at Heidelberg University.
In the enlightening article "The Perspective of COVID-19," Liu Yongmou, Mitcham, and Nordman raised the thorny issues of democratic theory in point 10, namely, strict technological governance and control and rebellious populism surging around. The tensions between socialism can only be mediated through what they call "moderate technological governance."
The argument in the article clearly shows that our vocabulary and the confrontational gestures it contains do not necessarily alleviate the views on crisis-related issues. In fact, from the perspective of Science and Technology Research (STS), a basic question can be raised, that is, how the COVID-19 epidemic has been discussed in society and what caused it. There are many independent and different views on this issue colliding with each other. Liu Yongmou and others expressed their surprise, "How quickly the modern knowledge society recovers to a model that is regarded as outdated in times of crisis" (argument 6), also It is the "Grand Scheme Optimizing" paradigm. The model is based on the principle of risk avoidance, and the core is based on the population science paradigm, and the corresponding expert governance (expertokratischen governance) is implemented in accordance with these premises. From this point of view, according to the authors, the core issue of crisis response is the excessive technological governance hegemony (technokratische Hegemonie) in times of crisis.
Let me emphasize that I don’t think that such hegemony does not exist, but it raises the question of whether this discourse can really help people understand the issues related to the COVID-19 crisis. It embodies the criticism of state governance, but in the argumentation of the article, it cannot fairly treat the complexity of these social cognitions that stimulate the crisis. To be clear: It is possible that the COVID-19 crisis is first of all a crisis of social self-understanding, because the vocabulary we talk about this crisis seems a bit weirdly outdated. These are reflected in the classification and comparison used to describe the course of the pandemic, especially when critically assessing the success or failure of pandemic containment measures. The fact that relying on professional knowledge to govern the country becomes the background. This professional knowledge is increasingly built up dynamically and fundamentally, and the dynamic moments of the crisis period also present another dimension. This tracking of the facts description as accurately as possible is an experiment that is ready to fail. It will become a control problem here, and it will also be a governance problem at the same time.
What does it mean to talk about the complexity of social cognition in this context? I think it is worth noting that in the face of potentially huge threats and uncertainties, there are conflicting scenarios of different coordination and cooperation issues that need to be resolved at the same time. How serious are the real problems related to the condition? How to minimize the occurrence of uncertain events? What is the appropriate measure? In order to resolve the crisis, to what extent are the restrictions on fundamental rights justified? What are the appropriate ways for the country to respond to the crisis? Knowledge uncertainty directly transforms into sociopolitical uncertainty—and vice versa. Similarly, knowledge, social inequality, and political differences are also becoming topics of discussion. Since there are also potentially huge risks indoors, this situation exacerbates control problems. Some people exaggerate it ("liberated home office middle class"), another part denies it ("COVID-19 rebels"), and the last part experiences it physically as a system-related group ( "People deeply affected by the virus").
There is no simple way out in this regard, but there will be a question anyway, why not continue to release the energy of experimentation so that we can not only understand the complex disputes between the level of knowledge, social inequality and political differences, but also transform them at the same time It is a practical strategy to discover knowledge about constructing these situations. Since the transfer of knowledge is extremely limited, the authors of that article put forward an important point. In fact, so far, the experimental space has been designed to be quite defensive, which has led to the limitations of the experimental space and the gradual loss of the legalization of the epidemic control policy. The sooner this legality issue can be resolved, the sooner a strong experimental structure can be designed and institutionalized. Only when top-down control and bottom-up social experiment culture are developed at the same time, a strong experimental space structure for overcoming such crises can be successfully realized. Not only in civil society, but also in the country, these must be based on the ability and willingness to participate and cooperate. This requires corresponding democratic policy measures as a prerequisite to ensure the solution of experimental problems institutionally in the face of a pandemic. In that case, discussing "verfeinerte Technokratie" (verfeinerte Technokratie) becomes redundant.
Public interest and personal interest: the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
Author: Jenny Mander; Translation: Peng Jiafeng
About the author: Janne Mende, a researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and National Law in Germany, is mainly engaged in global governance, international institutions and transnational norms.
The three authors provide a very useful starting point for discussing the social, political, and technological impact of the COVID-19 virus/COVID-19 pandemic. In the following, I will discuss the relationship between the technology (or even technological governance) of this epidemic and the political level.
On the one hand, the COVID-19 epidemic seems to have strengthened the conflict between these two levels. Therefore, the three authors vigilantly mentioned a kind of "technocratic mindset that breaks away from and opposes the discussion of political spheres and public values" (Liu Yongmou/Mitchem/Nordman, Argument 2). They even sketched a growing sense of tension, namely, "the'rational' people who exercise solidarity by recognizing the necessity of technology, and the somewhat reckless and rebellious populists who claim to be away from the political realm by invoking freedom and human rights. The tension between "(Liu Yongmou/Mitchem/Nordman, Argument 10).
On the other hand, in some respects, the epidemic has highlighted the narrow limits of the division between technology/technical governance and the political level, and at first glance it seems to have strengthened this division. This, on the contrary, shows the limitations of the frequently used term "technological domination". The word usually means efficiency and-more importantly-depoliticized.
Technical/technical governance solutions and political solutions to public challenges are at two different levels-at least it seems that way. However, the COVID-19 epidemic is a vivid reminder of the fact that even technical solutions serve the public interest. The prevention, containment and control measures related to the epidemic should be designed to protect individuals and all from the virus, and sometimes even go against personal wishes. This is the logic of a greater good: public interest may be higher than personal interest.
It is this contradiction between public interest and (specific) personal interest that seems to have triggered protests against the COVID-19 virus prevention and control measures. Here, I explicitly set aside the conspiracy theoretic motives of this protest. Instead, I looked at conflicts that arise from people who feel that their personal interests are limited, but they don’t agree with or understand (perhaps even don’t even believe) the existence of greater interests. This may be because they value their personal interests above the interests of others, but it may also be because they have been deprived of their rights so that they (thinking) did not benefit from the public interest in the first place. Identifying the reasons is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I will focus on the relationship between technical/technical governance solutions, public interest and personal interest.
At a certain point in time, technical/technical governance solutions depend on a certain legitimacy. At this point, they no longer represent non-politicized, purely technical problems; they must also prove their "output legitimacy"—usually in the form of problem-solving ability and efficiency. However, even the most technical export legitimacy is related to the public interest. [1] Efficiency is only effective in a specific context, and problem-solving ability can only be evaluated in the context of specific problems that need to be defined. For both, public interest constitutes an implicit or explicit reference point. The epidemic made this very clear. If scientists are promoted to the height of “authority” (Liu Yongmou/Mitcham/Nordman, argument 6), their authority must constitute their legitimacy through their contribution to the public interest. [2] Therefore, the political dimension (organization and management involving public interest) is always inherent in technology and technical governance solutions.
However, talking about public interest raises the question of who defines interest(s) as public interest. Who is included in the discussion of public interest, and who is excluded? Answering these questions involves the democratic concept of "input legitimacy," which is based on the participation and representation of citizens, as well as their preferences, interests, and personal wishes. [3]
From the perspective of input legality and output legality, this epidemic is neither special nor different from the common combination of governance and government. On the contrary, it magnifies the tension inherent in all democracies and political systems that rely on some kind of legitimacy and recognition (rather than pure force): the continuous, continuous, and intermittent relationship between the legitimacy of inputs and outputs between public and personal interests. Permeable tension. [4] This tension opens up the black box of objective constraints (Sachzwang) or technical urgency (Liu Yongmou/Mitchem/Nordman, introduction).
This argument does not provide a ready-made solution for the COVID-19 epidemic. But it helps to describe the ensuing challenges in more familiar terms. At least in the political and social aspects of this epidemic, we can build on political thought and practical experience. But this does not prevent us from opening up new paths, in fact it is quite the opposite. In this context, I put forward three key points for dealing with the political and social aspects of the epidemic.
First, the sharp division between technical/technical governance and political solutions must be overcome—but not simply to be eliminated. Instead, they depend on each other: technical expertise is based on political and social legitimacy, just as political solutions depend on technical expertise. If technology and technological governance solutions are not assumed to be non-political, their political influence and effects can be handled and discussed more clearly.
Second, describing the political and social aspects of the epidemic that need to reshape rational beliefs about COVID-19 virus prevention and control measures and the obvious opposition to irrational opposition to these measures. Doing so can promote dialogue between the two parties to prevent further alienation. (Of course, this does not refer to radical and extremist movements.) It can also effectively prevent "rebellious populist" parties from the assumption of "invoking human rights and freedom to dominate the political sphere" (Liu Yongmou/Mitchem/Nordman , Argument 10). On the contrary, emphasizing the political aspects of technicality, technological governance, and rational solutions can help regain these reference points. Human rights as a point of reference especially create a basis for emphasizing the connection between public interest and personal interest. In those cases where public interests are used to suppress personal interests and thus violate human rights, human rights can also help to take the lead in creating this connection. All UN member states have an obligation to respect, protect and ensure the realization of human rights. [5]
Third, any feasible epidemic prevention and control plan cannot simply ignore personal interests and support public interests, or vice versa. On the contrary, the tension between public interest and personal interest (the legitimacy of input and output) must be maintained to balance and reconcile the two so that neither party is ignored. Protecting the public interest during the epidemic may indeed require necessary restrictions on personal interests. It protects certain personal interests (such as health), but also resists other interests (such as not wearing a mask or meeting with friends).
At the same time, defining and protecting public interests must be a matter of extensive discussion that includes diverse personal interests and voices. There are various (sometimes difficult) measures to achieve this. These measures may include a high degree of transparency in the development of COVID-19 virus prevention and control measures and decision-making (this also helps communicate trial and error related to new challenges). These measures urgently need to include a strong local dialogue, inclusive and cooperative agenda to strengthen the sense of participation and responsibility of individuals (including to other groups in society and the public interest). Measures also include international and global cooperation,[6] and setting an example for the generation of unity and responsibility that individuals are required to demonstrate at the local level. Finally, measures must include consideration of the diversification of public interests. In addition to public health, it also includes human rights, decent living conditions and gender equality. These are just a few examples.
In short, these measures help to strengthen the internal connection between technology, technical governance and the legitimacy of experts and the public interest, as well as politics. Personal interests do not simply override public interests, especially when it comes to (other) everyone’s enjoyment of human rights. Although they are also important. The question of how to weigh these interests is not only a challenge for the current epidemic, but also a challenge for all governance constellations based on a certain degree of legitimacy.
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